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Audit committees, female directors and the types of female and 
male financial experts: Further evidence 
Abstract: 
Evidence on the association between female directors on audit committees and 
audit quality is weak. Further, researchers’ failure to identify the types of female 
and male financial experts may have a) resulted in the mixed evidence on the 
relationship between female financial experts on audit committees and financial 
reporting monitoring, and b) led them to question male financial experts on audit 
committees. Thus, we examine whether female directors and the types of female 
and male financial experts on audit committees are associated with audit quality. 
Using FTSE 350 firms from 2009 to 2017 and ordinary least-squares regression, 
this study finds that female directors and female accounting experts on audit 
committees are positively associated with audit quality. Our results may explain the 
conflicting evidence on the association between female financial experts and 
financial reporting oversight and also suggest that firms’ audit quality may increase 
with female accounting experts on audit committees.  
 











This research examines the impact of a female audit committee member on audit quality. 
Further, we investigate whether the financial expertise (both accounting and non-accounting) 
of female audit committee members improves audit quality. Empirical research provides 
evidence that the existence of female directors on the audit committee enhances earnings 
quality (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). The role of an audit committee 
is to oversee the financial reports (Aldamen, Hollindale, & Ziegelmayer, 2018) and thereby 
mitigate agency costs (Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010), suggesting the importance of audit 
committees. Further, Bédard and Gendron (2010) contend that audit quality is one of the 
mechanisms to determine audit committee effectiveness. Female directors on audit committees 
are expected to oversee management effectively and thereby improve audit quality because 
female directors are more likely to show lower tolerance towards opportunistic behaviour 
(Srinidhi et al., 2011; Zalata, Tauringana, & Tingbani, 2018). 
Following corporate collapses such as ENRON, policy-makers have attempted to 
overhaul corporate governance regulation by incorporating gender diversity in order to address 
the groupthink stemming from male-only boards (Wahid, 2019). Regulators in different 
countries have implemented mandatory female quotas. For example, Norway, Spain and 
France have a 40% female quota policy where non-compliance leads to sanctions such as fines, 
adverse impact on the award of state contracts, and the non-payment of directors’ fees 
(Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016). On the other hand, countries 
like Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) follow a voluntary approach (comply or 
explain principle) where firms are required to adopt and disclose their gender-diversity policies 
and in the case of non-compliance, provide an explanation [Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC), 2018; Securities Market Association, 2015; Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 
2016]. However, even in the case of a voluntary approach, countries heighten the pressure on 
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companies to increase female directors. For example, in the UK, government-supported reports 
frequently publish the progress of female directors and set voluntary targets, such as expecting 
FTSE 350 firms to enhance their female directors’ representation to 33% by 2020 (Department 
for Business, Innovation & Skills, 2015). Our study therefore empirically investigates the 
beneficial effects of female directors on audit committees. 
Prior research has examined the association between female directors on audit 
committees and audit quality but failed to adequately account for the practitioners’ assessment 
of audit quality. Aobdia (2019) argues that the researchers’ use of indirect proxies to capture 
unobservable audit processes is a weak approach when attempting to capture audit quality. 
Therefore, determining audit quality from the practitioners’ (regulatory bodies and audit firms) 
perspective is a more effective way to ascertain audit quality given that practitioners are likely 
to possess more information about the appropriateness of audit (Aobdia, 2019; Bell, Causholli, 
& Knechel, 2015)1.  
The extant auditing literature provides inconclusive evidence between the association 
of female director presence on the audit committee and audit fees (Aldamen et al., 2018; 
Ittonen, Miettinen, & Vähämaa, 2010; Lai, Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2017). Lai et al. (2017) find 
that the positive impact of female directors on audit fees is robust to an alternative audit quality 
proxy, namely, industry specialist audit firm. Although they adopt industry specialist audit 
firms to compare their audit fee results, this approach is insufficient, as Aobdia (2019) finds no 
association between industry specialist audit firms and practitioners’ assessment of audit 
quality. In contrast, Ittonen et al. (2010) find a negative association between the proportion of 
                                                          
1 Aobdia (2019) evidences that three audit quality proxies (audit fees, meeting or beating the zero earnings 
benchmark and financial restatements) capture a distinct dimension of practitioners’ audit quality assessments. 
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female directors on audit committees and audit fees, leading to inconclusive evidence2. Given 
that no study utilises the propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark as an audit 
quality measure, we are unsure about the monitoring effectiveness of female directors on audit 
committees. Thus, the present literature cannot be deemed sufficient to conclude an association 
between female directors on audit committees and audit quality. Therefore, we assess the 
relation between female directors on audit committees and audit quality using both audit fees 
and meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark as audit quality proxies.  
Financial expertise plays a vital role in the effectiveness of audit committees because a 
financial expert possesses more significant knowledge of financial statements (Bilal, Chen, & 
Komal, 2018; Tanyi & Smith, 2015). Regulators are, however, uncertain on the type of 
financial expertise considered most effective in monitoring financial reports. The United States 
(US) and the UK did initiate steps to consider only accounting experts as financial experts but, 
after receiving feedback from stakeholders, concluded that both accounting experts and non-
accounting financial experts are appropriate for complying with the requirement to include a 
financial expert on an audit committee (FRC, 2015; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017; Lee & Park, 
2018). The empirical research provides mixed findings on whether only accounting experts on 
audit committees perform an oversight function (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009), while a competing argument prevails that 
non-accounting experts on audit committees are also effective (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017; 
Goh, 2009; Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2014), warranting further investigation.  
We use UK companies listed on the stock market to examine our research questions, 
because the litigation environment of the US is likely to be more stringent than the UK 
                                                          
2 A positive association between female directors on audit committees and audit fees could indicate additional 
monitoring of female directors (Aldamen et al., 2018; Lai et al., 2017) while the negative relationship between 
female directors on audit committees and audit fees may stem from limited communication and greater conflicts 
due to the presence of diverse members on the audit committees (Ittonen et al., 2010). 
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(Khurana & Raman, 2004; Wu, Hsu, & Haslam, 2016), as Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn (2002) 
posit that class action suits are more prevalent in the US. Therefore, the better monitoring 
efforts of audit committee mechanisms are unlikely to be attributed to a highly litigious 
environment if the study is conducted in the UK. As a result, adopting the UK as our research 
setting may enhance the generalizability of findings (Wu et al., 2016). Moreover, Ghafran and 
O’Sullivan (2017) indicate that the UK follows comply or explain corporate governance 
regime. Hence, the UK context allows more variation in gender diversity practices, as the UK 
firms are not obligated to follow corporate governance policies. Our findings evidence that a 
total of 22% of audit committee members are female, and the number of accounting expert 
female directors (average 4%) is relatively lower than non-accounting expert female directors 
(average 10%), indicating a variation in financial expertise. 
This study offers multiple contributions. First, our findings establish an association 
between female directors on audit committees and audit in the UK. Second, this study finds 
that female accounting experts on audit committees are significantly and positively associated 
with audit quality, while female non-accounting experts on audit committees are insignificantly 
associated with audit quality. Thus, Zalata et al.’s (2018) finding that female financial experts 
on audit committees enhance financial reporting monitoring, may stem from female financial 
experts with accounting expertise, while Ittonen et al.’s (2010) evidence that female financial 
experts on audit committees are insignificantly associated with financial reporting oversight, 
may originate from female financial experts with non-accounting expertise. Third, our study 
offers a more in-depth analysis of male financial experts on audit committees by segregating 
them into accounting and non-accounting experts. As we evidence that both male accounting 
and male non-accounting experts on the audit committee are insignificantly associated with 
audit quality, we offer further evidence on the effectiveness of male financial experts.    
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses 
of the study. The data and method of the study are thoroughly discussed in Section 3. In Section 
4, we present and discuss the results. Finally, we conclude this study in Section 5.  
2. Hypotheses development  
Females may be more sensitive to ethics (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Zalata et al., 2018), given 
that they are likely to be more considerate due to distinct socialisation (Lund, 2008; Owhoso, 
2002; Srinidhi et al., 2011). Empirically, Bernardi, Bosco, and Columb (2009) find that female 
directors are positively linked with the firm being regarded as ethical. Similarly, Bernardi and 
Arnold (1997) substantiate that female managers depict higher moral development than male 
managers, suggesting that female directors are not expected to be involved in manipulating 
financial reports for personal gain (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Zalata et 
al., 2018). 
Female directors are unlikely to be associated with an all-male network, which 
enhances independence (Adams & Ferreria, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Zalata et al., 2018). 
Therefore, women directors are likely to be in a better position to question the decisions of 
other directors (Lai et al., 2017; Srinidhi et al., 2011). Moreover, females may demonstrate less 
overconfidence (Huang & Kisgen, 2013; Ittonen & Peni, 2012) and are more likely to be risk-
averse (Garcia-Blandon, Argilés-Bosch, & Ravenda, 2019; Ittonen, Vähämaa, & Vähämaa, 
2013), which is expected to enhance the level of monitoring (Lai et al., 2017; Srinidhi et al., 
2011). Empirically, studies show that female directors on an audit committee are likely to 
modify audit opinions (Pucheta-Martínez, Bel-Oms, & Olcina-Sempere, 2016), reduce 
earnings management (Gavious Segev, & Yosef, 2012; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Thiruvadi & 




On the other hand, as per social identity theory, directors are likely to develop 
associations with other directors in their own social category; thus, the presence of diverse 
members may have a negative impact on group communication (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 
1999). Therefore, given that female directors induce diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), their 
inclusion on audit committees may result in more conflicts and a lack of communication (Jehn 
et al., 1999; Ittonen et al., 2010). Ittonen et al. (2010) find a negative association between the 
proportion of female directors on the audit committee and audit fees. In addition, Sun, Liu, and 
Lan (2011) find no link between female directors on audit committees and discretionary 
accruals. 
Following the conflicting findings on the association between female directors on audit 
committees and audit quality, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1. Female directors on audit committees are significantly associated with audit 
quality. 
Agency theory is unlikely to be sufficient to explain a clear link between directors and 
their impact on organisations (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Gull, Nekhili, 
Nagati, & Chtioui, 2018). The theoretical framework proposed by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) 
emphasises a consideration of both agency theory and resource dependence theory when 
examining directors’ effectiveness, suggesting that the effectiveness of female and male 
financial experts on audit committees may depend on the type of financial expertise possessed 
by individual directors themselves.  
Accounting experts are pivotal in the monitoring of financial reports, given the 
sophisticated accounting involved in the financial statements (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Kim, Kwak, Lim, & Yu, 2017). Therefore, members with accounting or 
auditing know-how are more likely to be in a better position to question managers and auditors 
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(Dhaliwal et al., 2010) and review management’s response to the audit adjustments proposed 
by the auditors (DeFond et al., 2005). Similarly, Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) posit that 
the competency of accounting experts enables them to evaluate provisions concerning 
warranties and lawsuits. Thus, they may be able to appropriately assess areas where judgments 
are involved (DeFond et al., 2005) and therefore increase audit quality. 
Further, accounting experts might be considered to have more responsibility for 
monitoring financial reports, given their enhanced accounting knowledge; hence, they could 
be exposed to more significant reputational loss due to poor financial reporting, which may 
motivate accounting experts to intensify the monitoring of financial reports (Kim et al., 2017). 
Lee and Park (2018) substantiate that accounting experts on audit committees restrict managers 
in manipulating the tone of the MD&A (management discussion and analysis) sections of 
financial reports. Multiple studies provide evidence of the better financial reporting oversight 
of accounting experts on audit committees. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) find that 
accounting experts on audit committees are positively associated with accounting 
conservatism. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) report that accounting experts on audit 
committees increase accruals quality. DeFond et al. (2005) evidence that accounting experts 
on audit committees are associated with a positive market reaction. Also, Cohen, Hoitash, 
Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2014), and Kim et al. (2017), report a positive association 
between the presence of accounting experts on audit committees and audit fees. As a result, we 
propose that female and male accounting experts on audit committees are likely to be positively 
associated with the monitoring of financial reports and thereby higher audit quality:  




H2b. Male accounting experts on audit committees are positively associated with audit 
quality. 
Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard (2009) posit that non-accounting financial experts are less 
directly involved in financial reports. Thus, they may not have the requisite knowledge for 
monitoring financial statements (DeFond et al., 2005; Kim et al., 2017). As a result, non-
accounting experts on audit committees may diminish the effectiveness of audit committees. 
Naiker and Sharma (2009) substantiate that firms with non-accounting expertise on their audit 
committees are more likely to experience internal control deficiencies. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) find that non-accounting experts on audit committees are insignificantly 
associated with audit fees. Similarly, Dhaliwal et al. (2010) and Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008) substantiate that non-accounting experts on audit committees are insignificantly 
associated with accruals quality.  
However, Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) contend that non-accounting (finance and 
supervisory) financial experts may acknowledge the lack of accounting competence and thus 
demand extensive audit work. Additionally, they may possess relatively more industry 
knowledge, which can add value to audit committees’ monitoring capacity (Dhaliwal et al., 
2010). For example, industry knowledge may be crucial for appropriately assessing warranty 
provisions (Cohen et al., 2014).  
Supervisory experts may improve financial reporting quality due to their experience in 
supervising individuals with financial reporting duties (Naiker & Sharma, 2009). Regarding 
finance experts, Lee and Park (2018) suggest that they are competent in analysing financial 
reports because they may have developed these skills. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) also hold a similar 
viewpoint and contend that finance experts are competent in forecasting earnings and 
evaluating mergers and acquisitions, which enables them to possess greater knowledge about 
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the wide range of factors affecting firms and are thereby in a better position to assess whether 
financial reports depict the reality. This suggests that non-accounting (finance and supervisory) 
financial experts on audit committees are likely to improve audit quality.  
Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) report that non-accounting experts on audit committees 
increase audit fees. Further, Goh (2009) finds that supervisory expertise on audit committees 
is positively related to the timely remediation of internal control weaknesses. Moreover, Xie, 
Davidson, and DaDalt (2003) evidence that investment bankers on audit committees reduce 
earnings management. 
Due to the opposing views on the monitoring effectiveness of non-accounting experts 
on audit committees, we do not predict the direction of the hypotheses on female and male non-
accounting (finance and supervisory) experts:  
H3a. Female finance experts (non-accounting financial experts) on audit committees are 
significantly associated with audit quality. 
H3b. Male finance experts (non-accounting financial experts) on audit committees are 
significantly associated with audit quality. 
H4a. Female supervisory experts (non-accounting financial experts) on audit 
committees are significantly associated with audit quality. 
H4b. Male supervisory experts (non-accounting financial experts) on audit committees 
are significantly associated with audit quality. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sample 
This study focuses on all non-financial firms on the FTSE 350 index from 2009 to 2017. The 
FTSE 350 index is chosen because it consists of large as well as small firms (Lueg, Punda, & 
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Burkert, 2014; Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011), and because Lueg et al. (2014) contend that 
it ensures greater data availability. Non-financial firms are excluded because they have distinct 
regulatory and reporting requirements (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017; Lueg et al., 2014; Zalata 
et al., 2018). Further, only firms that were part of the FTSE 350 index from 2009 to 2017 are 
considered, given that the UK corporate governance regulation differentiates between firms on 
the FTSE 350 index and other firms listed in the UK; for example, it implements a less stringent 
requirement related to independent directors for non-FTSE 350 firms (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 
2017). 
Corporate governance data was manually collected from annual reports. Regarding 
financial characteristics, data was collected from the FAME database with the exception of 
location of the auditor, subsidiaries, market value of equity and annual market price return. 
Auditor’s location and the number of subsidiaries were obtained from annual reports while the 
market value of equity and annual market price return were collected from Datastream. Data 
for ascertaining audit fees and meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark was collected 
from the FAME database. Firms’ annual reports were downloaded from their respective 
websites, while GICS in the Osiris database was utilised for identifying the industry in which 
the firm operates. The restrictions above and missing information reduce the firm-year 
observations to 770 (761) for the audit fee model related to female directors on audit 
committees (female and male financial experts on audit committees). Further, in relation to our 
meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark, the final sample comprises 1130 (1119) for 
female directors on audit committees (female and male financial experts on audit committees) 
after taking into account the aforementioned data restrictions and missing information. These 
sample sizes are in line with other audit committee studies (Aldamen et al., 2018; Kusnadi, 
Leong, Suwardy, & Wang, 2016).  
3.2. Measurement of female directors, financial experts and audit quality 
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3.2.1. Female directors 
Female directors on audit committees are ascertained as the proportion of female directors on 
the audit committee (Gavious et al., 2012; Zalata et al., 2018). 
3.2.2. Types of financial expertise 
We adopt Dhaliwal et al. (2010), Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017, p. 584), and Lee and Park 
(2018), in segregating the financial expertise of the female and male audit committee members 
into three categories, namely accounting expertise (held or hold a position directly related to 
accounting and auditing, such as chartered accountants, chief financial officers, chief 
accounting officers, controllers and auditors), finance expertise (experience involving 
investment banking, financial analysis or any other position related to financial management), 
and supervisory expertise (chief executive officers and company presidents). 
3.2.3. Audit fees 
As discussed in the introduction, Aobdia (2019) contends that three different proxies capture a 
distinct dimension of the practitioners’ perspective of audit quality. Given that the audit 
committees do not directly influence financial restatements (Lai et al., 2017), audit fees and 
meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark are the two most appropriate audit quality 
proxies for examining the link between female directors on audit committees and audit quality. 
Therefore, we utilise two measures of audit quality: audit fees and meeting or beating the zero 
earnings benchmark. We use audit fees to address our research question and then examine our 
results in terms of meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark.  
Audit effort is likely to depict audit fees and, therefore, the higher the audit fees the 
higher the audit quality (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006). This 
study adopts the following audit fee models to assess whether female directors, female financial 
experts and male financial experts on audit committees are associated with audit fees: 
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audfee = β0 +  β1acfem + β2acind + β3acsize + β4acmeet + β5boardind + β6nonauditfee + 
β7size + β8stock + β9debt + β10london + β11subsidiary + β12roa + IND+ YE + Ɛ        … (1a) 
audfee = β0 +  β1femacc + β2femfinance + β3femsuper + β4mlacc + β5mlfinance + β6mlsuper 
+ β7acind + β8acsize + β9acmeet + β10boardind + β11nonauditfee + β12size + β13stock + 
β14debt + β15london + β16subsidiary + β17roa + IND+ YE + Ɛ        … (1b) 
All the above variables are defined in Table 1. Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) select 
their control variables in their audit fee model based on the prior UK research that finds 
significant audit fee determinants, as they argue that there is considerable literature on factors 
affecting audit fees. Therefore, we follow Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) in utilising the 
control variables related to our audit fee models.  
Given that the large size of the audit committee can either be effective due to a variety 
of directors’ experiences (Zalata et al., 2018), or likely to cause the members to neglect 
responsibility (Kent & Stewart, 2008; Vafeas, 2005), we do not predict the direction of the link 
between audit committee size and audit fees. Moreover, due to the lack of familiarity of 
independent directors with management (Zaman et al., 2011), independent directors and audit 
committee independence are predicted to be positively associated with audit fees. Further, 
greater audit issues are likely to be identified with more audit committee meetings (Zaman et 
al., 2011) and are thus expected to be positively associated with audit fees.  
In relation to control variables pertaining to firm characteristics, given the analysts’ 
scrutiny of large firms’ performance, these firms may practice earnings manipulation (Chih, 
Shen & Kang, 2008) and are likely to have a positive association with audit fees due to the high 
audit risk. Moreover, the greater the complexity involved in the audit, the higher the audit effort 
(Zaman et al., 2011), which may increase audit fees. Further, a higher proportion of receivables 
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and inventory balances depict enhanced audit effort due to more balance confirmations and site 
visits respectively (Lai et al., 2017), translating into higher audit fees.  
Additionally, a firm’s poor profitability position is likely to be indicative of higher audit 
risk (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017), so a negative association is predicted between profitability 
and audit fees. Furthermore, a positive association between London-based auditors and audit 
fees is predicted, as being in London entails a high living cost (Clatworthy & Peel, 2007). Also, 
as per Ezzamel, Gwilliam, and Holland (1996), firms facing non-typical issues require non-
audit services and also incur high audit fees. Thus, non-audit fees and audit fees are predicted 
to be positively associated. 
Measurement of the control variables follows prior literature: proportion of independent 
directors on the board (independent directors), number of audit committee members (audit 
committee size), number of audit committee meetings (audit committee meetings), proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committee (audit committee independence), log of 
number of subsidiaries (firm’s complexity), log of total assets (firm size), proportion of 
inventories to total assets and proportion of receivables to total assets (inventory and 
receivables), return on assets (profitability), log of non-audit fees (non-audit fees), and dummy 
variable of 1 if the auditor is London-based, otherwise 0 (London-based auditor) (Ghafran & 
O’Sullivan, 2017). 
3.2.4. Meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark 
This study also utilises the propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark as an audit 
quality proxy. Firms may manipulate earnings to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark in 
order to avoid a negative impact on their market value (Srinidhi et al., 2011; Tanyi & Smith, 
2015). Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) contend that if a firm is unable to meet the 
earnings benchmark, then the market perceives it as a sign of poor prospects and thus reduces 
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the firm’s market price. Therefore, according to Srinidhi et al. (2011), post-managed earnings 
of just above zero are likely to be linked to earnings manipulation rather than to an actual 
increase in performance. As the propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark is 
likely to depict earnings management (DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Srinidhi et al., 2011) and better 
auditing is expected to mitigate earnings management (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & 
Subramanyam, 1998; Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang, 2011; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999), 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue that meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark captures 
audit quality.  
We adopt the following meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark model to test its 
association with female directors, female financial experts and male financial experts on audit 
committees: 
meetbeat = β0 +  β1acfem + β2acind + β3acsize + β4acmeet + β5boardind + β6size + 
β7returngrow + β8lev + β9salegrow + β10mtb + IND + YE + Ɛ      … (2a)   
meetbeat = β0 +  β1femacc + β2femfinance + β3femsuper + β4mlacc + β5mlfinance + β6mlsuper 
+ β7acind + β8acsize + β9acmeet + β10boardind + β11size + β12returngrow + β13lev + 
β14salegrow + β15mtb + IND + YE + Ɛ        … (2b) 
All the variables are defined in Table 1. In line with Carey and Simnett (2006), Francis 
and Yu (2009), and Tanyi and Smith (2015), the propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings 
benchmark is ascertained as 1 if the return on assets is between 0 and 0.02, otherwise 0. 
Therefore, as the value of 1 is indicative of earnings manipulation, a negative sign in our main 
variables (female directors and types of female and male financial experts on the audit 
committee) will suggest higher audit quality. 
Control variables related to corporate governance are the same as in the audit fee model; 
however, the sign expected in meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark model is 
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opposite to what is expected in the audit fee model, as lower values in the meeting or beating 
the zero earnings benchmark variable are suggestive of better audit quality. This study adopts 
control variables for the financial characteristics (firm size, financial condition, and firm 
growth) from Arun, Almahrog, and Aribi (2015). As large firms are under higher pressure to 
perform, more earnings manipulation can be expected (Chih et al., 2008). Firms with either 
higher leverage or lower performance demonstrate poor financial condition and, hence, are 
more likely to manage earnings (Ittonen et al., 2013; Zalata et al., 2018). Ittonen et al. (2013) 
point out that growing firms are less transparent. Thus, growing firms are expected to be more 
prone to earnings management (Arun et al., 2015; Chih et al., 2008). Following Arun et al. 
(2015), firm size is the natural log of total assets, leverage is ascertained by determining the 
proportion of total liabilities to total assets and growth is determined as annual growth in sales 
and market-to-book ratio. Further, performance is ascertained through annual market return 
(Srinidhi et al., 2011).  
4. Results analysis  
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Table 2 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics. It shows that the average proportion of 
female directors on audit committees is around 22% in our sample. When compared to the 
value (12%) found by Zalata et al. (2018) in the US, it shows a greater presence of female 
directors on audit committees in the UK.  This is likely to reflect the increasing pressure within 
the UK to increase female directors (Department of Business, Innovation & Skills, 2011). 
These descriptive statistics also show that the female (male) accounting experts on audit 
committees comprise 3.54% (34.37) of our sample. Further, we find that the female (male) 
audit committee members with finance and supervisory expertise comprise 10% (17.90) and 
3.58% (14.55) respectively in our sample. These descriptive statistics suggest a greater 
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presence of male financial experts than female financial experts, which is in line with Zalata et 
al. (2018). 
Table 2 (Panel B) presents the mean difference test for samples with and without female 
directors on audit committees. It shows that firms with female directors on audit committees 
have higher audit fees and a lower propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark than 
those firms with no female directors on audit committees, in line with our expectations. 
Moreover, compared to firms without any female presence on the audit committee, there are 
more audit committee meetings held in firms with at least one female on the audit committee, 
which is consistent with Thiruvadi (2012). Additionally, similar to Aldamen et al. (2018), firms 
that include female directors on audit committees are larger in size. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. It reveals a positive (negative) and significant 
correlation between female directors on audit committees and audit fees (meeting or beating 
the zero earnings benchmark). Moreover, there is also a positive and significant correlation 
between female accounting and non-accounting (finance) experts on audit committees and 
audit fees. However, this analysis does not control for other variables in the models and, 
therefore, the regression analysis presented below is a more appropriate procedure for 
answering our research questions. Further, there are unlikely to be problems arising from 
multicollinearity as the variance inflation factors (VIF) values are considerably below 10 in 
our main models (maximum VIF value is 2.93) (Bose, Podder, & Biswas, 2017; Jackling & 
Johl, 2009).  
4.2. Regression analysis 
Given that firms in the sample are present in multiple years, time-series dependence may cause 
a particular firm’s residuals to be correlated over the years (Peterson, 2009), which is likely to 
introduce bias in the standard errors (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017). Following Ghafran and 
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O’Sullivan (2017) and Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), this study addresses this problem by 
clustering the standard errors at the firm level. Also, cross-sectional dependence may lead to a 
particular year’s residuals being correlated across firms (Peterson, 2009), which is addressed 
through introducing year dummies in line with Hassanein and Hussainey (2015).  
Column 1 of Table 4 shows a positive and significant association between female 
directors on audit committees and audit fees. Column 2 of Table 4 reveals that female 
accounting experts on audit committees are significantly and positively associated with audit 
fees. Further, we find no significant association between female non-accounting (finance and 
supervisory) experts on audit committees and audit fees. This study also finds that male 
accounting and male non-accounting experts on audit committees are insignificantly associated 
with audit fees. However, these results also need to be examined using the propensity to meet 
or beat the zero earnings benchmark as an additional audit quality proxy.  
Consistent with this study’s expectations, the study finds that firm size, audit 
complexity, receivables and proportion of independent directors are significantly and 
positively associated with audit fees. The study also shows that both London-based auditors 
and non-audit fees have a positive and significant association with audit fees, as predicted. In 
addition, a negative and significant relation between return on assets and audit fees also meets 
our prediction. 
4.3. Meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark 
Column 1 of Table 5 shows that there is a negative and significant association between female 
directors on audit committees and meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark. This 
negative sign depicts a positive association between the audit committee mechanisms and audit 
quality. Thus, given our significant and positive association between female directors on audit 
19 
 
committees and audit fees, we evidence that female directors on audit committees are positively 
and significantly related to audit quality; therefore, hypothesis 1 is accepted.  
Column 2 of Table 5 reports that female accounting experts on audit committees are 
significantly and negatively associated with the propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings 
benchmark. Considering our significant and positive association between female accounting 
experts on audit committees and audit fees, our study substantiates that female accounting 
experts have a significant and positive association with audit quality. Moreover, similar to our 
audit fee model, we find an insignificant association between female non-accounting experts 
and meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark. Therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported 
while these findings do not support hypotheses 3a and 4a. Additionally, both male accounting 
and male non-accounting experts are insignificantly associated with the propensity to meet or 
beat the zero earnings benchmark. As a result, hypotheses 2b, 3b and 4b are not supported. 
Several of our control variables are significant. Audit committee independence, audit 
committee meetings, firm size and firm’s financial condition are significantly associated with 
meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark and are in line with our predictions. 
4.4. Robustness analysis 
In order to ascertain the robustness of our finding pertaining to the positive link between female 
accounting experts on audit committees and audit quality, we conduct three further tests. First, 
we adopt another measure of ascertaining female accounting on audit committees (here, we 
utilise a dummy variable of 1 if there is at least one female audit committee member with 
accounting expertise, otherwise 0). Column 1 of Table 6 (audit fee model) and Column 1 of 
Table 7 (meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark model) reveal that our findings are 
consistent with another proxy of female accounting experts on audit committees.  
20 
 
Third, following Aobdia (2019) and Castillo-Merino, Garcia-Blandon, and Martinez-
Blasco (2019), we employ another cut-off of 0 to 0.01 in our meeting or beating the zero 
earnings benchmark model. In Column 2 of Table 7, we still find a negative and significant 
relation between female accounting experts on audit committees and the propensity to meet or 
beat the zero earnings benchmark. 
4.5. Endogeneity 
Although we find that there is a positive association between female accounting experts on 
audit committees and audit quality, it is essential to address possible endogeneity bias. Hence, 
we adopt the propensity score matching methodology to mitigate these endogenous concerns. 
First, following Habib, Muhammadi, and Jiang (2017), Hardies, Breesch, and Branson (2015), 
Hooghiemstra, Hermes, Oxelheim, and Randøy (2019), Peel (2018), and Shipman, Swanquist, 
& Whited (2017), all variables except the percentage of female accounting experts on the audit 
committee (the main variable in our case) are used to determine the probability of including 
female accounting experts on the audit committee. Hardies et al. (2015) contend that this 
approach is in line with the research on propensity score matching.  
Secondly, matched pairs are ascertained, where a treated firm (with female accounting 
experts present on the audit committee) is matched with a control firm (without any female 
accounting experts present on the audit committee) with the closest propensity score to the 
treated firm (nearest neighbour matching) (Lai et al., 2017; Peel, 2018). In this step, the 
matching is performed without replacement, where control firms are matched to treated firms 
only once, as Shipman et al. (2017) posit that this procedure is standard in accountancy 
research. Moreover, as per Gull et al. (2018) and Hooghiemstra et al. (2019), a calliper distance 
(the maximum difference in the propensity scores of treated and control firms) of 0.01 is also 
implemented to enhance the quality of the matching. Finally, regression is conducted on the 
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matched sample; this last step, according to Peel (2018), addresses any remaining differences 
in observable characteristics between matched and control firms and also entails a doubly 
robust approach in which “if either the matching or the parametric model is correct, but not 
necessarily both, causal estimates will still be consistent” (p. 175). 
Tables A.1 (audit fees) and A.2 (meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark) show 
the similarity between the treated and control firms, given that no observable firm characteristic 
is significant, thus suggesting successful matching (Habib et al., 2017; Peel, 2018). This shows 
that the treated and control firms are similar concerning the firm characteristics observed, so 
any effect on the dependent variable (audit quality, in this case) arises due to the variable of 
interest (female accounting experts on audit committees, in this study) (Habib et al., 2017; Peel, 
2018). Column 2 of Table 6 (audit fees) and Column 3 of Table 7 (meeting or beating the zero 
earnings benchmark) present the regression analysis on the matched sample and indicates that 
female accounting experts on audit committees are positively and significantly associated with 
audit quality, given that they are positively linked with audit fees and negatively related with 
meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark. Overall, propensity score matching analysis 
suggests that the finding associated with the positive relationship between female accounting 
experts on audit committees and audit quality is robust to any endogeneity bias. 
4.6. Tokenism 
A stream of research suggests that the influence on decision making requires the combined 
effort of multiple members – for example, at least two female directors may be necessary to 
influence decision making, whereas a singular female director may often be subject to tokenism 
(Erkut, Kramer, & Konrad, 2008). Therefore, we conduct an additional regression analysis 
separating the firm-years which have at least two female directors in the audit committees (n = 
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279). We find that our preliminary findings remain qualitatively unchanged, which suggest that 
tokenism has no impact on our findings. 
4.7. Omitted variable bias 
The concept of audit quality is not static and therefore identifying the determinants of audit 
quality is not conclusive. To mitigate the omitted-variable bias introduced by unobservable 
firm characteristics, we execute an analysis where we control for whether the firm experiences 
a going concern opinion. We also control financial reporting quality using discretionary 
accruals in the regression model, which are expected to control for time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics. We find that the preliminary results remain consistent and we therefore 
conclude that our findings are robust. 
5. Conclusion 
Corporate governance regulators’ efforts to increase gender diversity in firms (Ali, Ng, & 
Kulik, 2014; Lai et al., 2017; Srinidhi et al., 2011; Terjesen & Sealy, 2016) indicate the 
importance of thoroughly examining whether female directors on audit committees improve 
audit quality. However, the previous literature on this aspect is not convincing as it fails to 
incorporate the practitioners’ assessment of audit quality. Aobdia (2019) argues that it is 
important to consider the practitioners’ views on audit quality, given that they possess more 
information about the audit and, hence, provide better judgment on audit quality. Thus, by 
incorporating practitioners’ evaluations of audit quality in the audit quality measures, we 
provide more convincing evidence that female directors on audit committees act as an effective 
mechanism in improving audit quality.  
Further, prior literature (Ittonen et al., 2010; Zalata et al., 2018) examining female 
financial experts on audit committees and financial reporting monitoring is mixed. We argue 
that this may be because the researchers did not segregate female financial experts into 
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accounting or non-accounting expertise. Zalata et al. (2018) find that female financial experts 
on audit committees mitigate earnings management while Ittonen et al. (2010) evidence an 
insignificant association between female financial experts on audit committees and audit fees. 
Our findings seem to explain this conflicting evidence, as we find that the accounting expertise 
of female financial experts on audit committees is significantly and positively associated with 
audit quality while there is an insignificant association between non-accounting (finance and 
supervisory) female financial experts on audit committees and audit quality. 
This study has several implications for regulators, policy-makers, firms and 
accountancy professionals. First, this study supports legislating to achieve a higher presence of 
female directors and suggests the beneficial effects of incorporating female directors. Also, our 
findings indicate that a female quota policy is likely to be useful only if female directors on 
audit committees have accounting expertise. Second, regulators in the US and the UK have 
made efforts to only consider audit committee members with accounting expertise as part of 
the requirement to include a financial expert on audit committees. However, they have been 
unable to implement this policy due to the concerns stemming from the rigidness of such a 
directive (FRC, 2015; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017; Lee & Park, 2018). Our results suggest 
that policy-makers should emphasise the benefits of including accounting experts on audit 
committees to the stakeholders. Third, our study benefits managers who are attempting to 
enhance the audit quality of firms, as we find that firms experience an increase in audit quality 
if female directors with accounting expertise are present on the audit committee. Finally, this 
study’s findings suggest a limited presence of female accounting experts on audit committees. 
As we substantiate here that female accounting experts positively influence audit quality, our 
study recommends the accountancy profession implement policies to attract more female 
members. These involve, for example, conducting seminars/conferences where female 
accountants are invited, devising sponsorship opportunities for females, and making efforts to 
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reduce the gender pay gap for female accountants, which may inspire and motivate females to 
join the accounting profession.  
Our study’s findings should be considered with caution. Despite using multiple 
methodologies to mitigate any endogenous bias, we acknowledge that endogeneity might not 
have been completely addressed. Furthermore, our findings may not apply to other research 
settings with distinct cultures and institutions. Lastly, the finding of an insignificant association 
between female non-accounting experts and audit quality may be dependent on whether the 
experts possess other characteristics, such as additional directorships. Therefore, future 
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Table 1: Variable definition   
Variables Definition  
Audit fees (audfee) Log of audit fees 
Meeting or beating the zero earnings 
benchmark (meetbeat) 
1 if return on assets is between 0-0.02 otherwise 0 
Female directors on audit committees (acfem) Proportion of female directors on the audit committee 
Female accounting experts on the audit 
committee (femacc) 
Proportion of female accounting experts on the audit 
committee  
Female non-accounting (finance) experts on 
the audit committee (femfinance) 
Proportion of female non-accounting (finance) experts on 
the audit committee  
Female non-accounting (supervisory) experts 
on the audit committee (femsuper) 
Proportion of female non-accounting (supervisory) experts 
on the audit committee  
Male accounting experts on the audit 
committee (mlacc) 
Proportion of male accounting experts on the audit 
committee 
Male non-accounting (finance) experts on the 
audit committee (mlfinance) 
Proportion of male non-accounting (finance) experts on 
the audit committee 
Male non-accounting (supervisory) experts on 
the audit committee (mlsuper) 
Proportion of male non-accounting (supervisory) experts 
on the audit committee 
Audit committee size (acsize) Number of audit committee members 
Audit committee meetings (acmeet) Number of audit committee meetings 
Audit committee independence (acind)   Proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committee 
Board independence (boardind) Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Firm size (size)         Log of total assets             
Inventory (stock) Proportion of stock to total assets 
Receivables (debt) Proportion of receivables to total assets 
London-based auditor (london) 1 if the auditor is based in London otherwise 0 
Complexity (subsidiary) Log of subsidiaries 
Profitability (roa) Return on assets (proportion of net income to total assets) 
Non-audit fees (nonauditfees) Log of non-audit fees 
Leverage (lev) Proportion of liabilities to assets 
Sales growth (salegrow) Annual sales growth 
Market-to-book ratio (mtb) Proportion of market value of equity to book value of 
equity  
Annual market price return (returngrow) Annual market price growth  
Alternative definition of female accounting 
experts on audit committees (dumfemacc) 
Dummy variable of 1 if at least one female accounting 
expert is present on the audit committee otherwise 0 
IND Industry effects 





Table 2: Panel A Descriptive statistics    
      Standard   
Variable                  Mean     Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
audfee  7.140 1.320 1.099 10.589 
meetbeat  0.066 0.248 0.000 1.000 
acfem  0.218 0.187 0.000 1.000 
femacc  0.035 0.094 0.000 0.667 
femfinance 0.100 0.142 0.000 0.500 
femsuper 0.036 0.092 0.000 0.400 
mlacc 0.344 0.179 0.000 1.000 
mlfinance 0.179 0.201 0.000 0.750 
mlsuper 0.146 0.180 0.000 0.750 
acsize  3.957 1.065 2.000 8.000 
acmeet  4.536 1.688 1.000 15.000 
acind  0.990 0.064 0.000 1.000 
boardind  0.564 0.109 0.000 0.857 
nonauditfee  6.313 1.374 1.099 9.864 
size  15.073 1.463 12.140 19.621 
stock  0.124 0.176 0.000 0.928 
debt  0.105 0.087 0.000 0.660 
london  0.762 0.426 0.000 1.000 
subsidiary  2.834 1.027 0.000 6.031 
roa  0.083 0.106 -1.343 0.391 
returngrow  0.130 0.423 -0.961 3.818 
lev  0.622 0.196 0.141 1.331 
salegrow  0.064 0.218 -0.740 3.639 
mtb  2.979 13.195 -123.612 147.540 












Table 2: Panel B  Mean difference test  
 acfem = 0 acfem = 1 Mean Difference t-statistic 
audfee 6.721 7.063 -0.342*** -4.312 
meetbeat 0.092 0.054 0.038*** 3.122 
acsize 3.364 4.187 -0.823*** -14.211 
acmeet 4.354 4.655 -0.301** -2.025 
acind 0.983 0.931 0.052* 1.714 
boardind 0.534 0.583 -0.049*** -6.601 
nonauditfee 6.062 6.086 -0.006 -0.099 
size 14.566 14.988 -0.422*** 4.768 
stock 0.108 0.122 -0.014 1.218 
debt 0.115 0.151 -0.036* 1.785 
london 0.722 0.655 0.067** 1.997 
subsidiary 2.931 2.723 0.208*** 3.219 
roa 0.083 0.096 -0.013 -0.775 
returngrow 0.127 0.115 0.012 0.337 
lev 0.554 0.628 -0.074*** -4.629 
salegrow 0.082 0.064 0.018* 1.884 
mtb 6.175 6.122 0.053 0.512 
This table presents differences in means between firms without a female director on audit committees and firms 
with at least one female director on the audit committee. All variables are defined in Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** 












Table 3: Correlation matrix         
    audfee meetbeat acfem femacc femfinance femsuper mlacc mlfinance  mlsuper 
audfee  1.000         
meetbeat  0.026 1.000 
 
      
acfem   0.077* -0.079* 1.000       
femacc  0.069* -0.035 0.393* 1.000      
femfinance  0.102* 0.011 0.547* -0.095* 1.000     
femsuper  -0.022 -0.036 0.323* -0.107* -0.105* 1.000    
mlacc  -0.047 0.033 -0.280* -0.278* -0.032 -0.058* 1.000   
mlfinance   -0.002 0.022 -0.216* 0.034 -0.229* -0.085* -0.352* 1.000  
mlsuper  0.042 0.001 -0.287* -0.139* -0.142* -0.088* -0.157* -0.320* 1.000 
acind  0.159* -0.044 0.080* 0.026 0.041 0.059* -0.094* 0.039 0.024 
acsize  0.267* -0.050* 0.270* 0.052* 0.168* 0.092* -0.200* -0.045 0.02 
acmeet  0.412* -0.003 0.068* 0.048* 0.162* -0.045 0.042 0.087* -0.068* 
boardind  0.509* -0.01 0.152* 0.105* 0.131* 0.02 0.046 -0.052* -0.016 
nonauditfee  0.728* 0.03 -0.056* -0.027 0.045 -0.134* 0.025 0.075* 0.023 
size  0.760* 0.054* 0.108* 0.017 0.185* 0.002 0.03 0.03 -0.025 
stock  -0.272* -0.036 0.092* 0.078* -0.015 -0.034 -0.033 0.052* -0.111* 
debt  0.017 -0.043 -0.015 0.054* -0.079* -0.026 -0.078* -0.059* 0.141* 
london  0.385* 0.065* -0.016 0.063* -0.094* 0.055* -0.02 0.107* -0.027 
subsidiary  0.466* -0.029 -0.045 0.075* 0.009 -0.084* -0.011 -0.047 0.026 
roa  -0.168* -0.149* 0.049* 0.051* 0.019 -0.076* 0.064* -0.034 -0.047 
returngrow  -0.049* -0.086* -0.015 0.02 -0.064* -0.006 -0.006 0.033 -0.001 
lev  0.229* 0.048* 0.108* 0.097* 0.086* -0.021 -0.148* -0.050* 0.054* 
salegrow  -0.078* -0.052* -0.060* -0.014 -0.057* -0.011 0.01 0.071* 0.011 















Table 3 (continued)         
  acind acszie acmeet boardind nonauditfee size stock debt 
acind    1.000        
acsize  0.021 1.000       
acmeet  0.010* 0.083* 1.000      
boardind  0.344* 0.338* 0.392* 1.000     
nonauditfee  0.094* 0.207* 0.385* 0.403* 1.000    
size  0.112* 0.215* 0.430* 0.494* 0.647* 1.000   
stock  0.036 -0.034 -0.143* -0.133* -0.257* -0.163* 1.000  
debt  0.037 0.074* -0.034 -0.054* -0.080* -0.321* -0.069* 1.000 
london  0.093* 0.184* 0.242* 0.307* 0.350* 0.379* 0.008 -0.182* 
subsidiary  0.146* 0.120* 0.149* 0.196* 0.271* 0.188* -0.282* 0.227* 
roa  0.007 0.003 -0.081* -0.010 -0.141* -0.233* 0.070* 0.203* 
returngrow  -0.010 0.015 -0.062* -0.032 -0.010 -0.068* 0.056* 0.017 
lev  0.043 0.075* 0.028 0.082* 0.158* 0.132* -0.229* 0.099* 
salegrow  0.016 0.008 -0.060* -0.018 -0.033 -0.048* 0.042 -0.017 
mtb  0.004 -0.055* 0.029 0.003 -0.165* -0.166* -0.004 0.191* 
      london subsidiary    roa returngrow  lev   salegrow       mtb   
london     1.000        
subsidiary    0.102* 1.000       
roa   -0.136*  0.085*  1.000      
returngrow    -0.023 -0.013 0.163*     1.000     
lev    0.037 0.202* -0.043 -0.055* 1.000    
salegrow    0.029 -0.040 0.089* 0.227* -0.102* 1.000   
mtb    -0.059* 0.016 0.462* 0.074* 0.000   0.060* 1.000   





Column 1 reports the results on the link between female directors on audit committees and audit fees. Column 2 
Table 4: Regression analysis of female directors and female and male financial experts on audit 
committees (Audit fees) 
 Female directorship Female and male 
financial experts 
acfem 0.489**  
 (2.613)  
femacc  0.582* 
  (1.725) 
femfinance  0.080 
  (0.280) 
femsuper  0.470 
  (1.045) 
mlacc  -0.284 
  (-1.291) 
mlfinance  -0.190 
  (-0.678) 
mlsuper  -0.023 
  (-0.094) 
acind 0.013 0.077 
 (0.027) (0.173) 
acsize -0.022 -0.016 
 (-0.653) (-0.463) 
acmeet -0.014 -0.009 
 (-0.368) (-0.248) 
boardind 1.186*** 1.106*** 
 (2.944) (2.678) 
nonauditfee 0.288*** 0.296*** 
 (4.666) (4.662) 
size 0.491*** 0.495*** 
 (11.670) (10.940) 
stock -0.448 -0.418 
 (-1.457) (-1.349) 
debt 2.939*** 2.849*** 
 (3.822) (3.751) 
london 0.224** 0.194* 
 (2.242) (1.832) 
subsidiary 0.216*** 0.211*** 
 (5.177) (4.898) 
roa -0.607* -0.567* 
 (-1.950) (-1.949) 
Constant -3.785*** -3.756*** 
 (-5.570) (-5.540) 
Observations 770 761 
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.820 
Year effects YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES 





presents the results for the relation between the types of female and male financial experts on audit committees 
and audit fees. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Reported results include t-statistics in parentheses 
along with coefficients. All variables are defined in Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 5: Probit regression (Meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark) 
 Female directorship Female and male 
financial experts 
acfem -1.014***  
 (-2.888)  
femacc  -1.327* 
  (-1.706) 
femfinance  -0.181 
  (-0.312) 
femsuper  -0.595 
  (-0.710) 
mlacc  0.426 
  (0.909) 
mlfinance  0.544 
  (1.209) 
mlsuper  0.118 
  (0.300) 
acind -3.043*** -2.117*** 
 (-2.748) (-2.677) 
acsize -0.087 -0.205** 
 (-1.450) (-2.452) 
acmeet -0.096** -0.0879** 
 (-2.351) (-2.170) 
boardind -0.128 0.642 
 (-0.192) (0.693) 
size 0.205*** 0.108* 
 (3.849) (1.654) 
returngrow -0.268* -0.417 
 (-1.791) (-1.633) 
lev 0.655** 0.435 
 (2.065) (1.175) 
salegrow 0.038 -0.322 
 (0.152) (-0.781) 
mtb -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.080) (-1.038) 
Constant 0.032 -0.259 
 (0.025) (-0.196) 
Observations 1,130 1,119 
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.141 
Year effects YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES 
Wald test 101.57*** 139.59*** 
Column 1 reports the results for the association between female directors on audit committees and the propensity 





female and male financial experts on the audit committee and meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Reported results include z-statistics in parentheses along with 
coefficients. All variables are defined in Table 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6: Additional tests (Audit fees)   
 Dummy (Female 
accounting experts) 
Matched sample 
dumfemacc 0.169**  
 (2.126)  
femacc  0.599* 
  (1.779) 
acind 0.165 -0.079 
 (0.373) (-0.131) 
acsize -0.008 -0.006 
 (-0.210) (-0.132) 
acmeet -0.014 0.022 
 (-0.376) (0.621) 
boardind 1.137*** 1.028 
 (2.842) (1.567) 
nonauditfee 0.282*** 0.414*** 
 (4.628) (2.842) 
size 0.502*** 0.407*** 
 (11.670) (3.637) 
stock -0.436 -0.465 
 (-1.431) (-1.022) 
debt 2.880*** 3.435*** 
 (3.957) (4.074) 
london 0.188* -0.095 
 (1.846) (-0.634) 
subsidiary 0.211*** 0.178*** 
 (5.032) (3.129) 
roa -0.582* -0.353 
 (-1.776) (-0.401) 
Constant -4.008*** -3.051** 
 (-5.789) (-2.442) 
Observations 770 200 
Adjusted R2 0.820 0.839 
Year effects YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES 
F Test 83.23*** 93.63*** 
This table presents the results after performing additional tests on the association between female accounting 
experts on audit committees and audit fees. Column 1 utilises a dummy variable method to ascertain female 
accounting experts. Column 2 reports the results based on the propensity score matched sample. All standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. Reported results include t-statistics in parentheses along with coefficients. 






Table 7: Additional tests (Meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark) 
 Dummy Alternative cut-
off value 
Matched sample 
dumfemacc -0.367*   
 (-1.801)   
femacc  -1.593* -1.753** 
  (-1.686) (-2.126) 
acind -2.181***  -2.099 
 (-2.968)  (-1.184) 
acsize -0.189** -0.211** -0.205 
 (-2.361) (-2.356) (-1.578) 
acmeet -0.083** -0.101* -0.151* 
 (-2.089) (-1.815) (-1.764) 
boardind 0.583 1.192 0.074 
 (0.663) (1.037) (0.053) 
size 0.105* 0.059 0.240** 
 (1.668) (0.754) (2.162) 
returngrow -0.285 0.120 -0.166 
 (-1.151) (0.556) (-0.429) 
lev 0.368 0.644 0.278 
 (1.015) (1.526) (0.401) 
salegrow -0.328 -0.219 -0.369 
 (-0.822) (-0.400) (-0.665) 
mtb -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.868) (0.087) (-0.372) 
Constant 0.329 -1.712 -1.032 
 (0.262) (-1.378) (-0.452) 
Observations 1,130 1,038 249 
Pseudo R2 0.129 0.121 0.166 
Year effects YES YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES YES 
Wald test 111.68*** 189.61*** 47.51*** 
This table presents the results after performing additional tests on the association between female accounting 
experts on audit committees and the propensity to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark. Column 1 adopts a 
dummy variable method to ascertain female accounting experts. Column 2 determines meeting or beating the zero 
earnings benchmark by utilising an alternative cut-off value of 0-0.01. Further, in Column 2, audit committee 
independence is dropped because applying a lower cut-off value resulted in all firm-year observations with a fully 
independent audit committee. Column 3 reports the results based on the propensity score matched sample. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Reported results include z-statistics in parentheses along with 










Table 8: Additional test incorporating possible omitted variables [including going concern opinion and 
financial reporting quality (discretionary accruals)] and tokenism 
    audfee meetbeat audfees meetbeat audfee meetbeat audfee meetbeat 
 Test for checking the effect of omitted 
variables 
Test for checking the effect of tokenism 
[when the presence of female director is 
two or above] 

























































         
Control 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observation 753 739 753 739 249 249 249 249 
F-statistic 82.512*** - 79.154*** - 77.589*** - 76.060*** - 



















All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Reported results include t-statistics (Column 1, 3, 5 and 7) and 
z-statistics (Column 2, 4, 6 and 8) in parentheses along with coefficients. All variables are defined in Table 1. *** 







  Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Mean difference (Audit fees)   
                          Treated                       Control        p-value 
acind 0.992 0.977 0.260 
acsize  4.350 4.470 0.494 
acmeet  4.770 4.530 0.314 
boardind  0.606 0.587 0.251 
nonauditfee  6.481 6.317 0.440 
size  15.475 15.297 0.419 
stock  0.136 0.164 0.319 
debt  0.105 0.119 0.250 
london  0.860 0.850 0.842 
subsidiary  3.013 2.862 0.290 
roa  0.091 0.079 0.151 
Column 1 and 2 in this table shows the mean values of observable firm characteristics for treated (presence of a female 
accounting expert on the audit committee) and control (absence of a female accounting expert on the audit committee) 
firms after nearest neighbour matching. Column 3 reports the p-values for the mean differences. All variables are defined 
















Table A.2: Mean difference (Meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark) 
                          Treated                       Control        p-value 
acind 0.995 0.992 0.588 
acsize  4.107 4.095 0.914 
acmeet  4.681 4.663 0.917 
boardind  0.595 0.606 0.349 
size  15.094 15.111 0.921 
returngr  0.144 0.093 0.250 
lev  0.647 0.643 0.857 
salegr  0.069 0.041 0.213 
mtb  4.866 6.129 0.823 
Column 1 and 2 in this table shows the mean values of observable firm characteristics for treated (presence of a female 
accounting expert on the audit committee) and control (absence of a female accounting expert on the audit committee) 
firms after nearest neighbour matching. Column 3 reports the p-values for the mean differences. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 
